DoD contract termination liability: an analysis of the special termination cost clause (STCC) by Rendon, Rene G. & Mutty, John
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2006
DoD contract termination liability: an
analysis of the special termination cost
clause (STCC)
Rendon, Rene G.







Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. 
 








DoD Contract Termination Liability:  
An Analysis of the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
30 September 2006 
by 
Dr. Rene G. Rendon, Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School 
















The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, 
please contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
e-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - i - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Abstract 
This research paper explores the Department of Defense (DoD) policies and 
practices for managing contract termination liability.  The specific purpose of the 
research is to review current policies, practices, and procedures for funding and 
managing contract termination liability within the DoD.  The research proposes 
alternative approaches for improving the DoD’s ability to manage contract 
termination liability and discusses the resulting effect of each alternative on defense 
acquisition practices.  First, we provide a brief review of regulatory and policy 
guidance on contract termination liability as reflected in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and the Financial Management Regulations (FMR).  We then 
discuss the current practices and procedures for funding and managing contract 
termination liability and identify results from interviews and document reviews with 
various Air Force, Navy, Army, and other DoD agencies. Next, we present program 
management challenges and preliminary observations and findings based on our 
research of current contract termination liability policies and real-world practices.  A 
discussion of alternative approaches to funding contract termination liability is then 
presented, including the use of Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC).  Finally, 
this research concludes with a summary and recommendations on how the DoD can 
improve the policies and practices for managing contract termination liability. 
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Executive Summary 
This research paper explores the Department of Defense (DoD) policies and 
practices for managing contract termination liability.  The specific purpose of the 
research is to review current policies, practices, and procedures for funding and 
managing contract termination liability within the DoD.  The research then proposes 
alternative approaches for improving the DoD’s ability to manage contract 
termination liability and discusses the resulting effect of each alternative on defense 
acquisition practices.  Finally, this research concludes with a summary and 
recommendations on how the DoD can improve the policies and practices for 
managing contract termination liability. 
This research found that the regulations and policies pertaining to the 
management and funding of contract termination liability are inconsistent and subject 
to interpretation.  Program managers, finance and budget managers, and 
contracting officers have differing interpretations of the requirement for funding 
contract termination liability.  Furthermore, the practices and procedures used in 
defense acquisition program offices reflect this inconsistency. 
A review of current practices and procedures for funding and managing 
contract termination liability and historical data of past contract terminations found 
that the probability of a contract termination for convenience is very small, and 
program managers’ approaches to managing contract termination liability reflects 
this probability. The normal procedure for handling the potential liability associated 
with a contract terminated for convenience is to “budget” for the liability. Then, in 
coordination with the contractor, the required amount of funding is tracked on a 
regular basis. In this case, budgeting for Termination Liability does not mean 
obligating funds specifically for that purpose.  
Interviews with various acquisition program offices indicate that program 
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termination liability because the procedure they currently use to handle contract 
termination liability allows them to keep all of the funding appropriated for their 
program.  Furthermore, program managers are not in favor of a “tax” that would 
negate the requirement to budget for contract termination liability. A tax would 
deprive them of funds that they currently have at their disposal. Additionally, if all 
programs were taxed, there is a general concern that the pooled funds would likely 
be lost—either the military Departments (or DoD) would use them to solve other 
problems if they were not required to cover a liability, or Congress would look upon 
the funds that had been set aside as a “slush fund,” making them tempting for other 
uses. 
Interviews also indicated that support for increased use of STCCs is not 
evident, either at the program level or the OMB or Congressional level. Congress 
has expressed its concern through report language. OMB correspondence has 
indicated that support for more than one STCC per service is unlikely.  However, it 
should be noted that those programs that have significant funding problems and/or 
are concerned about the possibilities of termination do support additional use of 
STCCs. In fact, these programs would prefer to have a STCC that covers more cost 
elements than the standard STCC. 
Finally, this research concluded with the following recommendations for the 
DoD’s management of contract termination liability:  1. Remove the ambiguity and 
improve the consistency in the regulations pertaining to the management of contract 
termination liability; 2. Refrain from imposing a tax system to provide funding for 
potential contract termination liability; and, 3. Continue to use STCCs for the larger 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to explore current Department of Defense 
mechanisms for addressing contract termination liability, review current practices 
and procedures for funding and managing Termination Liability, and propose 
alternative approaches to improve the DoD’s ability to manage Termination Liability 
and its effect on defense acquisition programs.  First, a review of regulatory and 
policy guidance on contract termination liability is presented.  Next, a review of 
current practices and procedures for funding and managing Termination Liability is 
discussed, based on interviews and document reviews with various Air Force, Navy, 
and other DoD agencies.  Program management challenges and preliminary 
observations and findings are then presented.  Alternative approaches to funding 
Termination Liability are discussed, including the use of Special Termination Cost 
Clauses (STCC).1  Finally, a summary and recommendations are presented. 
Regulatory and Policy Guidance 
This section of the research report focuses on the regulatory and policy 
guidance on Termination Liability and the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC).  
The regulatory and policy guidance covering Termination Liability (and, specifically, 
Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC)) is found in the DoD Financial 
Management Regulation (FMR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS).  In addition, the Air Force Financial Management Regulation 
is also discussed as an example of Agency-specific guidance on contingent liability.   
                                            
1 DoD FAR Parts 249.50170 and 252.249-7000 permit the use of Special Termination Cost Clauses 
(STCC) in fixed-price incentive contracts and incrementally funded cost reimbursement contracts. If 
contracts containing a STCC are terminated before completion, the special termination charges are 
covered by the unobligated balance of the applicable appropriation, subject to any congressional 
approval required for reprogramming. The extent to which the STCC can be used is limited to the 
ability of the Service or Agency to cover expected termination costs from unobligated balances.  All 
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Termination Liability 
The DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) defines Termination 
Liability as: 
The amount of prepayments that cover payments required by the contract, 
and any damages and costs that may accrue from the cancellation of such 
contract.  Funds prepaid for Termination Liability will convert to cover actual 
expenditures in the event that the contract not be terminated prior to 
performance completion. Termination Liability may not apply to 
articles/services provided under other authorities of the Foreign Assistance 
Act or AECA. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 15) 
The Financial Management Regulation (FMR) categorizes Contingent 
Liabilities (CLs) as probable, possible, or remote (DoD, 2006c).  The terms probable, 
reasonably possible, and remote identify three areas within that range as follows: 
1. Probable: The future event or events are likely to occur. 
2. Reasonably possible: The chance of the future event or events occurring is 
more than remote but less than likely. 
3. Remote: The chance of the future event or events occurring is slight. 
Probable CLs must be covered by a commitment of funds. Probable CLs are 
most likely to become actual liabilities. Commitments are not required for possible 
CLs and should not be established for remote CLs (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 4, Ch. 13, pp. 
241-242). 
The budgeting for Contingent Liabilities is discussed in the following excerpts 
taken from the DoD Financial Management Regulation: 
Special Provisions for Determining the Amounts of Commitments  
Contingent Liabilities Remaining under Outstanding Contracts. There are 
contingent liabilities for price or quantity increases or other variables that 
cannot be recorded as valid obligations in the cases of (1) outstanding fixed-
price contracts containing escalation, price redetermination, or incentive 
clauses, or (2) contracts authorizing variations in quantities to be delivered, or 
(3) contracts where allowable interest may become payable by the US 
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the “Disputes” clause contained in the contract (see subparagraph 080202.D, 
below). Amounts to cover these contingent liabilities should be carried as 
outstanding commitments pending determination of actual obligations. The 
amounts of such contingent liabilities, however, need not be recorded at the 
maximum or ceiling prices under the contracts. Rather, amounts should be 
committed that are estimated conservatively to be sufficient to cover the 
additional obligations that probably will materialize, based upon judgment and 
experience. In determining the amount to be committed, allowances may be 
made for the possibility of downward price revisions and quantity underruns. 
Each contingent liability shall be supported by sufficient detail to facilitate 
audit. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 3, Ch. 8, para. 080202)   
Budgeting for Termination Liability on Incrementally Funded RDT&E Contracts 
The legal requirements of the Anti-deficiency Act and the long-standing policy 
of not committing a successor Congress to a course of action both make it 
necessary that the unliquidated obligation for an incrementally funded, multiple-year 
contract be sufficient at all times to cover the cost of terminating that contract for the 
convenience of the Government.  
Budgeting to cover Termination Liability will not increase the total amount 
budgeted for the program. It will require that the distribution of funds by fiscal year 
be shifted more towards the earlier years of the contract than if funds had been 
budgeted only to cover the actual bill to be paid each year. The distribution of funds 
by fiscal year shall be such that, if a contract is terminated at any point during the 
fiscal year, all termination costs can be financed from the unliquidated obligation on 
the contract without recourse to reprogramming of funds, supplemental 
appropriations, or awaiting the appropriation of funds for the succeeding fiscal year’s 
funding increment. All programs shall adhere to this policy with the following two 
exceptions, both of which are to be used rarely. 
a. Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC). DoD FAR Parts 249.50170 
and 252.249-7000 permit the use of STCC in fixed-price incentive 
contracts and incrementally funded cost reimbursement contracts. If 
contracts containing an STCC are terminated before completion, the 
special termination charges are covered by the unobligated balance of 
the applicable appropriation, subject to any congressional approval 
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used is limited to the ability of the Service or Agency to cover expected 
termination costs from unobligated balances. A recordable obligation 
under the STCC arises when the contract is actually terminated. If a 
proposed STCC would require an above-threshold reprogramming 
action when a program is terminated, the approval to use the STCC 
shall be obtained from the USD (Comptroller) before the contract or 
contract modification is awarded. All STCCs, regardless of dollar 
amount, require prior notification of the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees. 
b. Statutory Waivers. The Department is not required to budget for, or 
obligate funds sufficient to cover, Termination Liability in connection 
with an incrementally funded RDT&E contract if Congress has 
expressly exempted the program or contract from that requirement. 
When this situation arises, however, the budget exhibits for the 
program shall clearly indicate the value of the unfunded Termination 
Liability by year for the current year, budget year, and the outyears 
covered by the FYDP. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 2A, Ch. 1, para. 010214) 
Termination Liability is considered a contingent liability since adequate funds 
must be committed to cover the liabilities resulting from the termination of contracts, 
including any potential or Contingent Liabilities (Gill, 2003).   
The DoD FMR explains Contingent Liabilities as follows: 
Contingent Liability—The term has two meanings. As a budgetary term, it 
represents variables that cannot be recorded as valid obligations. Such 
variables include (1) outstanding fixed-price contracts containing escalation, 
price redetermination, or incentive clauses, or (2) contracts authorizing 
variations on quantities to be delivered, or (3) contracts where allowable 
interest may become payable by the US Government on contractor claims 
supported by written appeals pursuant to the "DISPUTES" clause contained 
in the contract. As a proprietary accounting term, it represents an obligation, 
relating to a past transaction or other event or condition that may arise in 
consequence, as a future event now deemed possible but not probable. 
When the liability is determined to be possible, but not probable, the potential 
liability is disclosed as a footnote to the financial statements. When the 
potential liability becomes probable, it is recorded in the accounts as a current 
liability or a reduction of an asset. The budget definition is the preferred 
usage. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 15) 
Thus, according to DoD FMR, Volume 2A, Chapter 1, "all termination costs 
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reprogramming of funds, supplemental appropriations, or awaiting the appropriation 
of funds for the succeeding fiscal year's funding increment" (2006c).  The two 
exemptions to this are a Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) and a Statutory 
Waiver.  
In addition, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 080512 of the DoD FMR states that 
in the case of termination of a contract, the contract shall be decreased to an 
amount that is sufficient to meet the settlement costs under the termination. 
The Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Financial Management Reference 
System (2005, February) provided more detailed guidance on funding termination 
costs.  The AFMC FMRS states the following concerning funding termination costs: 
The funded activity should commit the estimated funds to cover the expected 
contingent liability (CL).  This estimated CL amount is in excess of the 
contract awarded amount recorded as an obligation. The financial manager 
must record commitments for CLs against the applicable FY and 
appropriation cited on the contract.  Normally, funds for CLs are maintained 
locally. Funds are committed for a contingent liability at the time of contract 
award, based on the amount provided by the contracting officer [...]. 
Commitments are not recorded for STCC or contingent termination liabilities.  
Obligations are recorded when the action to terminate is taken. (Air Force, 
2005, February)  
The AFMC FMRS further states that funds are committed for all “probable” 
CLs (funding for “possible” or “remote” CLs is not necessary) as defined in a matrix.  
“The CL Matrix is used to identify, categorize according to probability, and track CLs 
throughout the life of a contract [...] must be reported to SAF/FM semi-annually” 
(AFMC, 2005, February). 
As indicated above, the DoD FMR refers to two exceptions to the policy of 
budgeting for Termination Liability.  These include the Special Termination Cost 
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Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
 Regulatory and policy guidance related to the use of Special Termination 
Cost Clauses is found in the DoD FMR  (“Budgeting for Termination Liability on 
Incrementally Funded RDT&E Contracts,” p. 3) and the DoD FAR.    
 Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 49 provides guidance 
on contract terminations, the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) provides the 
guidance and prescribes the clause specifically for Special Termination Costs.  The 
DFARS guidance at 249.501-70 states the following: 
249.501-70 Special Termination Costs. 
(a) The clause at 252.249-7000, Special Termination Costs, may be used in 
an incrementally funded contract when its use is approved by the agency 
head. 
(b) The clause is authorized when— 
(1) The contract term is two years or more; 
(2) The contract is estimated to require— 
(i) Total RDT&E financing in excess of $25 million; or 
(ii) Total production investment in excess of $100 million; and 
(3) Adequate funds are available to cover the contingent reserve 
liability for special termination costs. 
(c) The contractor and the contracting officer must agree upon an amount that 
represents their best estimate of the total special termination costs to 
which the contractor would be entitled in the event of termination of the 
contract. Insert this amount in paragraph I of the clause. 
(d)   (1) Consider substituting an alternate paragraph I for paragraph I of the 
basic clause when— 
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(ii) The contractor’s cost risk associated with contingent special 
termination costs is expected to fluctuate extensively over 
the period of the contract. 
(2) The alternate paragraph I should provide for periodic negotiation 
and adjustment of the amount reserved for special termination 
costs. Occasions for periodic adjustment may include— 
(i) The Government’s incremental assignment of funds to the 
contract;  
(ii) The time when certain performance milestones are 
accomplished by the contractor; or 
(iii) Other specific time periods agreed upon by the contracting 
officer and the contractor.  
A review of the DFARS clause reveals that the clause may be used on 
incrementally funded contracts when: the contract term is two years or longer and is 
estimated to require in excess of $25 million of Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, or a total of over $100 million of production investment.    
Incrementally funded contracts are those contracts in which funds are 
incrementally obligated throughout the period of performance.  Typically, cost 
reimbursement RDT&E contracts are incrementally funded and require the use of 
the Limitation of Funds Clause at FAR 52.232-22.  This clause requires the 
contractor to notify the Contracting Officer in writing whenever it has reason to 
believe the cost it expects to incur in the next 60 days, when added to all costs 
previously incurred, will exceed 75% of the total amount allotted on the contract 
(DoD, 2006b, 52.232-22). 
Another requirement of the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) is that 
there will be adequate funds available to cover the contingent reserve liability for 
special termination costs.   
In addition, the clause states that the contractor and the contracting officer 
must agree upon an amount that represents their best estimate of the total special 
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of the contract.  These special termination costs are identified within the DFARS in 
the actual Special Termination Costs clause as follows: 
252.249-7000 Special Termination Costs. 
As prescribed in 249.501-70, use the following clause: 
SPECIAL TERMINATION COSTS (DEC 1991) 
(a) Definition. “Special termination costs,” as used in this clause, means only 
costs in the following categories as defined in Part 31 of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)— 
(1) Severance pay, as provided in FAR 31.205-6(g); 
(2) Reasonable costs continuing after termination, as provided in FAR 
31.205-42(b); 
(3) Settlement of expenses, as provided in FAR 31.205-42(g); 
(4) Costs of return of field service personnel from sites, as provided in 
FAR 31.205-35 and FAR 31.205-46I; and 
(5) Costs in paragraphs (a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this clause to which 
subcontractors may be entitled in the event of termination. 
(b) Notwithstanding the Limitation of Cost/Limitation of Funds clause of this 
contract, the Contractor shall not include in its estimate of costs incurred 
or to be incurred, any amount for special termination costs to which the 
Contractor may be entitled in the event this contract is terminated for the 
convenience of the Government. 
(c) The Contractor agrees to perform this contract in such a manner that the 
Contractor’s claim for special termination costs will not exceed 
$________. The Government shall have no obligation to pay the 
Contractor any amount for the special termination costs in excess of this 
amount. 
(d) In the event of termination for the convenience of the Government, this 
clause shall not be construed as affecting the allowability of special 
termination costs in any manner other than limiting the maximum amount 
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(e) This clause shall remain in full force and effect until this contract is fully 
funded. 
(End of clause)(DoD, 2006a, 252.249-7000)  
Thus, the Special Termination Cost Clause limits the amount of special 
termination (as agreed between the government and the contractor) costs that the 
Government is liable for in a Termination for Convenience.  It should be noted that 
the STC clause does not apply to the regular termination costs as outlined in FAR 
31.205-42.   
Agency Approval for STCC 
As stated in the DFARS clause, the use of the STC clause is subject to 
approval of the agency head.  A review of the various agency FAR supplements 
provides some perspective on how this approval is obtained. 
The Air Force FAR supplement at AFFARS 5349.501-70 provides additional 
and specific policy related to the use of the Special Termination Cost Clause.  
AFFARS 5349.501-70 specifically states the following: 
5349.501-70 Special termination costs. 
(a) Contracting officers shall refer to Volume 2A, Chapter 1, Section 010213, 
paragraph C.2 of DoD 7000.14-R, DoD Financial Management 
Regulation, for Congressional notification and additional approval 
requirements for Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCCs). Because 
STCCs require special notification to Congress and entail a long approval 
process over which the Air Force has little control, the contracting officer 
should allow SAF/AQCK sufficient time to process requests to use DFARS 
252.249-7000, Special Termination Costs (i.e., not less than 90 days prior 
to contract award). The request shall include the following: 
(i) A detailed breakdown of applicable cost categories in the clause at 
DFARS 252.249-7000 (a)(1) through (5), which includes the reasons 
for the anticipated incurrence of the costs in each category; 
(ii) Information on the financial and program need for the clause, 
including an assessment of the contractor’s financial position and 
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(iii) Clear evidence that only costs that arise directly from a termination 
would be compensated under the clause. Costs that would be 
incurred by the Government, regardless of whether a termination 
occurs, shall not be covered by an STCC. 
(b) The contracting officer shall obtain SAF/FM approval prior to authorizing 
any increase in the Government’s maximum liability under the clause. (Air 
Force, 2006, 5349.501-70) 
The AFFARS is the only agency-level FAR guidance that gives more specific 
instruction on the coordination and review process, as well as the Congressional 
notification requirement for the use of STCCs.  This guidance also identifies the 
requirement for referencing the DoD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) for 
specific notification and approval requirements. 
Statutory Waiver 
The second exception to the Termination Liability funding policy is the 
Statutory Waiver.  This exception is explained in the FMR as follows: 
Statutory Waivers. If a program is exempted by Public Law from the 
requirement to budget for Termination Liability, the fiscal year increments may 
be budgeted on a pay-as-you-go basis, providing only sufficient funds to 
cover the disbursements expected to be made in that fiscal year. When this 
situation arises, however, the budget exhibits for the program shall clearly 
indicate the value of the unfunded Termination Liability by year for the current 
year, budget year, and the outyears covered by the FYDP. (DoD, 2006c) 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the regulatory and policy 
guidance pertaining to the funding of Termination Liability and the use of STCCs is 
found in two different functionally oriented regulations—the Financial Management 
Regulation (FMR) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  This regulatory 
guidance on budgeting for contract termination liability from two different functional 
areas of DoD acquisition increases the potential for different interpretations or even 
misinterpretation of the DoD policy.  These differences in policy interpretation are 
reflected in the practices and procedures used by the various DoD services.  This 
evident discrepancy will be discussed next in the review of current practices and 
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Review of Current Practices and Procedures 
Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center 
Interviews were conducted with contracting and financial management 
officials for various System Program Offices (SPOs) at the Air Force Space and 
Missile Systems Center.  See Attachment 1 for a list of interview questions.  The 
following SPOs were interviewed in respect to their contracts requiring Termination 
Liability, and the use of an STCC:  SBIRS, STSS, and the Launch Vehicle program 
office.  
1.  Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS):   
The SBIRS contract (F04701-95-C—0017) requires the funding of 
Termination Liability (TL).  The contract previously contained the DFARS clause 
252.249-7000, Special Termination Costs (1991), but this clause was removed on 
12 August 2005 with P00313 of the contract.  Currently, the contract does not 
contain the STC clause, and the TL funds are not exclusively “fenced” apart from the 
obligated contract funds.  In addition, the Air Force relies on the contractor to ensure 
that sufficient funds are available in the event of a termination.  
2.  Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):   
The STSS is a Missile Defense Agency program with the contract executed 
by the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center.  The STSS contract does 
require the funding of Termination Liability; however, it does not contain an STC 
clause.  The obligated finds for TL are not fenced apart from the other program 
funds.  The system program office maintains periodic communication between the 
PCO and the Contractor to estimate current TL requirements.  In addition, the 
system program office uses the Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR), as one 
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3.  Launch Vehicle Programs:     
The Launch Vehicle program contracts do require the funding of Termination 
Liability; however, they do not contain an STC clause.  The obligated finds for TL are 
not fenced apart from the other program funds.  The system program office 
maintains periodic communication between the PCO and the Contractor to estimate 
current TL requirements.   
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: 
The JSF program was directed to seek a waiver of Termination Liability at 
Milestone B. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) refused to support a 
waiver of all Termination Liability but indicated that it would support an STCC.  
Preparation of the STCC proved to be a fairly labor-intensive process. The 
estimates for those items that are allowable under an STCC are a subset of what is 
covered normally under Termination Liability. Both the program office and the 
contractor found that an STCC required calculations outside of the “norm.”  The JSF 
program currently maintains an STCC clause. 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM) 
The Naval Sea Systems Command has no programs with an STCC.  Current 
practice entails the tracking of potential Termination Liability by both the program 
offices and the contractors on a periodic basis. Funds are identified within the 
contract to ensure that sufficient funding exists at all times to cover Termination 
Liability in the event a Termination for Convenience of the government should occur. 
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Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) 
The Naval Air Systems Command has no programs using an STCC. There is 
a feeling that, generally, the Comptroller is not in favor of STCCs. Current practice 
entails the tracking of potential Termination Liability by both the program offices and 
the contractors on a periodic basis. Funds are identified within the contract to ensure 
that sufficient funding exists at all times to cover Termination Liability in the event a 
Termination for Convenience of the government should occur. However, funds are 
not set aside (committed) solely for that purpose. 
United States Marine Corps 
Our research indicated that the Marine Corps has no acquisition programs 
containing a STCC. 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA)/Defense Acquisition Challenge 
Program (DACP) 
There is no clear policy as to who is responsible for the determination of a 
program’s likelihood of termination, i.e., probable, possible, or remote possibility. 
STCCs are used on a very limited basis. Partly, because there is limited 
experience with STCCs, the process seems long and complicated. Most program 
managers and contractors will be going through the process for the first and only 
time. 
The contractor’s cost-accounting system determines TL. Because a STCC 
covers only certain items associated with TL, the figures are not those that are 
normally calculated and available to the contractor/program manager. 
MDA 
Boeing resisted use of STCCs with MDA initially. Program managers didn’t 
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such calculations were completed, the company became a supporter. The program 
saw an initial gain of about $300M in available monies to run the MDA. 
OSD GC’s opinion was that while there is nothing statutory regarding 
Termination Liability, the interpretation has been that by not setting aside funds to 
cover TL, there is a risk that termination of a program without those funds, in 
essence, is committing a future Congress to spend money. 
The authors’ recommendation in the case of MDA is: Because large programs 
have multiple contracts, why not allow the program manager determine how TL will 
be covered rather than mandating that each contract cover its own portion? 
Future Combat System (FCS) 
Boeing is quite enthusiastic about the STCC in the FCS program. Regarding 
FCS, both Boeing and the program manager would be in favor of including all TL 
costs—not just those included in the STCC. 
Discussion items included the benefits that large development contracts 
would derive from an STCC. Congressional reluctance to approve STCCs does not 
seem to be supported by the limited frequency of program terminations. Budgeting 
for TL at the project level seems less efficient than at the headquarters level.  
OSD Office of the General Counsel 
In the last three years, the USAF has drafted the most STCCs. No Navy 
programs utilize them, and the only Army program that the OSD Office of the 
General Counsel had worked on was the Comanche. 
The Office cited that one major “roadblock” is the reluctance of Congress to 
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Summary: 
Interviews with representatives from all of the services seemed to indicate 
levels of support for increased use of the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
that ranged from enthusiastic to indifferent.  
For those programs that had gone through the STCC process, the support 
was generally quite favorable; in fact, PMs also generally favored an expansion of 
the cost items covered. Expanded coverage would, in turn, release more money for 
program execution. They were also unanimous in their observations of the difficulty 
of establishing a STCC both from the workload (paperwork) level to the time 
required to get the paperwork through the OSD, OMB and Congress. 
For those activities without an STCC, there was a general indifference toward 
the use of such a clause. Our research did not detect a major concern for the 
requirement to identify funds for the possibility of funding TL. Most programs do not 
have a separate line-item for TL. The amount that would be required to fund TL is 
identified by both the program office and the contractor. That amount is compared to 
what is currently obligated and unobligated, and adjustments are made accordingly. 
Negotiations with the contractor appear to result in a “dual use” for the funds. As 
long as there is no indication that a termination is likely, the funds that would be 
needed for termination are used for program execution. In the unlikely event of a 
termination, the funds will be pulled back and reapplied for the contract termination. 
Funding TL at the project level, especially for the programs with multiple 
contracts, was looked upon as overkill. It was felt that the program manager should 
have the flexibility to move money between contracts, as required, for those 
programs that were not line-item funded. 
Our research/interviews identified some program management challenges 
pertaining to managing Termination Liability and the use of STCCs.  This will be 
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Program Management Challenges: 
A defense acquisition Program Manager faces multiple challenges when 
considering the issue of Termination Liability, including determining: 
• How much should be budgeted for Termination Liability? 
• How should the Program Manager account for Termination Liability? 
• If funding is set aside (committed) for Termination Liability, how should 
a program be managed with less money available than was budgeted 
for and appropriated by Congress? 
• How should the PM determine the likelihood of a need for Termination 
Liability (what is the probability of the program being terminated)? 
• How should a Program Manager decide whether to seek a waiver for 
funding Termination Liability or apply for a Special Termination Cost 
Clause (STCC)? 
1.  How much should be budgeted for Termination Liability? 
While certain sections of the FMR and FAR would seem to leave little doubt 
that a program manager must budget for Termination Liability to avoid possible 
violation of the Anti-deficiency Act, it is less clear that these regulations require the 
actual commitment of funds solely for the purpose of assuring coverage of TL. For 
example, the section of the FMR that discusses Contingent Liabilities (see above), 
would lead one to the conclusion that a program with only a possible or remote 
chance of termination need not commit funds to cover the possibility of termination. 
Even though the requirement to avoid violation of the Anti-deficiency Act remains, 
there appears to be recognition that a healthy program can accommodate that 
statute. A PM can assure his/her program can do so through a practical accounting 
of funds available to manage a program, recognizing that there is only a remote 
chance that the program will need the same funds for a different purpose. For a 
program with a greater chance of termination, the program manager seems to be 
facing a “Catch 22.” To ensure the survivability of a weak program, every dollar 
available could best be used for execution of the program; yet, money is required to 
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that the program will be terminated—i.e., committing funds for Termination Liability 
makes them unavailable for program execution at the time they are most needed. 
The amount required to be committed depends on both the program 
manager’s best estimates and the contractor’s estimates. During the life of the 
program, the estimates will change and likely diminish as the program matures and 
work is performed and products or services are delivered. 
2.  How should the Program Manager account for the funding of Termination 
Liability? 
As the ultimate result of a budget submitted by the program manager, 
Congress appropriates money for a program with standard restrictions as to 
Purpose, Time, and Amount. These restrictions require the program manager to 
spend the funds for those items specified by Congress within the time limits imposed 
by the applicable appropriation, and in an amount not to exceed the appropriation. 
Congress does not provide additional funding to cover the potential liability that 
would occur for a program terminated for the convenience of the government. For 
that reason, committing funds specifically to address Termination Liability imposes a 
restraint on a program not envisioned by Congress. Several options would seem to 
exist for the PM. Funds may be committed for TL with the attendant restrictions on 
program execution, or the PM may track the potential requirement for TL without 
specifically committing funds. The latter approach provides more flexibility and 
allows the PM to execute his/her program in a manner consistent with both the 
contractor’s and Congress’ expectations as reflected in the budget. 
3.  If funding is set aside (committed) for Termination Liability, how should a 
program be managed with less money available than was budgeted for and 
appropriated by Congress? 
Before a budget is submitted to Congress it will already have been scrubbed, 
reviewed, and approved at multiple levels. The purpose of those reviews is to ensure 
that the program is executable and funded at the minimum level required. Unless a 
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his/her budget goes forward. Congress has also been known to trim money from 
programs for a variety of reasons, especially those programs that are considered at 
risk. When money is appropriated, the amount of funding is determined by the 
scrubbed budget. Routinely, programs are “taxed” by higher levels. Therefore, it is 
normal for a PM to have little flexibility in program execution. Because Congress 
does not appropriate additional monies to fund Termination Liability, by definition, 
committing funds to cover TL will leave a program short of funds.  
4.  How should the PM determine the likelihood of a need for Termination 
Liability (what is the probability of the program being terminated)? 
The probability of terminating a program for convenience of the government 
has historically been quite low. (This will be discussed later in this report.)  Most 
programs have gone through an intensive justification and approval process before 
they make it into a Service’s budget. Prior to receiving funding, they are reviewed 
and approved at the OSD and Congressional levels. Because of the stiff competition 
for resources, a program manager will normally have sufficient reason to believe that 
his/her program will survive if milestones are met, budgets are adhered to, and 
priorities don’t change. Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to support the fact 
that the likelihood of termination is small—even if the aforementioned qualifications 
are not met. Many programs that have missed their milestones repeatedly, greatly 
exceeded their budgets, or have transferred from the spotlight to the shadows have 
been continued. Therefore, only those programs in the direst straights with a lack of 
Congressional support would qualify for the “probable” category when considering 
the need to budget for Termination Liability. Program managers and contractors 
have a vested interest in continuing their programs and, as advocates, are perhaps 
not the best qualified to make a “health” decision for a program. Someone at the 
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5.  How should a Program Manager decide whether to seek a waiver for 
funding Termination Liability or apply for a Special Termination Cost Clause 
(STCC)? 
If a Program Manager is required to set aside funds to cover Termination 
Liability, a waiver of that requirement would be the most useful. An STCC which 
eliminates the requirement for the funding of a subset of the items associated with 
Termination Liability would be the next most useful outcome. In both cases, the 
financial pressures on the program will be significantly reduced in that all funding 
associated with the program can be used for execution of the program. Once again, 
the Program Manager is the victim of a conundrum. Congress has shown a distinct 
lack of enthusiasm for STCCs and an even greater distaste for the waiver of funding 
for Termination Liability. Those feelings have been mirrored by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) in that it, too, has evidenced a bias against STCCs 
and blanket waivers. Additionally, those programs in the greatest need are the ones 
least likely to obtain approval. 
Probability of Termination for Convenience 
In an attempt to determine the probability of a contract being terminated for 
the convenience of the government, this research accessed data from the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  A sample of contracts administered by the 
DCMA was analyzed to determine what percentage of those contracts were cost-
type contracts, and then to determine what percentage of those cost-type contracts 
were terminated for the convenience of the government.  Since budgeting for 
Termination Liability applies to incrementally funded cost-type contracts, this 
research focused only on cost-type contracts.  Some assumptions in this method 
were that all cost-type contracts were incrementally funded and that these contracts 
required the funding of Termination Liability.  The limitation of this analysis was 
based on the shortcomings of the DCMA database in particular and on the DoD as a 
whole.  The DoD database does not capture data relating to the funding of 
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The DCMAs in Atlanta, Georgia, and in Los Angeles, California, were each 
asked to provide data on cost-type contracts. Data from Atlanta included contracts 
for the period FY1998 to FY2005. The period covered in the Los Angeles data was 
from FY1995 to FY2006. (See Attachment 2 for the DCMA data.) 
Data Analysis 
1.  DCMA Atlanta 
During the period of analysis, the DCMA had 325,000 open contracts.  Of 
these contracts, the DCMA had 518 contracts terminated for convenience out of a 
total 10,901 total terminations. That means that the probability of a contract being 
terminated for convenience is 0.16% (518/325,000). During this same period, of the 
10,901 contract terminations in the DCMA database, 306 are cost-type contracts. 
That means that cost-type contracts represent approximately 2.8% of the terminated 
contracts. 
Thus, the probability that a contract will be terminated for convenience and 
that the contract will also be a cost-type contract are approximately .0045% (518 X 
.028)/325,000). 
From a dollar perspective, DCMA is responsible for $852B in contracts. For 
all terminated contracts, the dollar value is $8.16B. From a dollar perspective, it 
would appear that the potential liability is greater than that based solely on the 
number of contracts and contract terminations. That is, using dollar value as a 
criterion, it would appear that the probability of a termination is approximately .95% 
(8.16/852).  The dollar value of the terminated cost type contracts is $1.29B. That 
would mean that from a dollar perspective, the probability of a termination is 
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2.  DCMA Los Angeles 
The data from DCMA Los Angles included information from Palmdale, Santa 
Ana, Los Angeles, Boeing Seattle, Seattle, Boeing Long Beach, Northrop Grumman 
El Segundo, San Diego, Pratt & Whitney, Northern California, Lockheed Sunnyvale 
and Northrop Grumman Redondo Beach. While not all locations’ data spanned the 
entire period (e.g., Santa Ana data are from 2 January 2002), the number of 
contracts and terminations covered are considered representative.  
During this period of analysis, DCMA Los Angeles managed 3159 cost-type 
contracts.  Of these 3159 cost-type contracts, there were 10 terminations for the 
convenience of the government, or .31% (10/3159). The total value of the contracts 
was $64.4B. The value of the terminated contracts was $440M. From a dollar 
perspective, the risk of a termination for a cost-type contract was .68%. 
Data Comparison 
It was anticipated that the data from DCMA Atlanta and DCMA Los Angeles 
would be comparable in that one is a subset of the other.  While the values do vary 
from one site to the other, what is apparent is the small likelihood of the termination 
for convenience of a cost-type contract. When looked at as a percentage of the 
number of contracts, it is significantly less than 1%. Perhaps the dollar value of the 
terminated contracts should be perceived as the most critical indicator because the 
liability of the government is measured in dollars, not numbers of contracts. Although 
the data would seem to indicate that higher-dollar-value contracts are the most 
susceptible to termination, the risk of termination based on dollar criteria is still less 
than 1%. 
It should be noted that data not available for analysis was the cost of 
terminations incurred by the government. (Figures of 10% of the contract value or 
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Observations and Findings 
This research included a review of the regulatory and policy guidance on 
Termination Liability found in the Financial Management Regulation (FMR) and the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  In addition, the researchers conducted 
interviews with various DoD program management offices and analyzed samples of 
DoD contracts related to the management of Termination Liability.  Based on these 
reviews, interviews, and analyses, the research team identified the following 
observations and findings: 
1.  Inconsistent Approach 
There is an inconsistent approach among the various military and DoD 
agencies to managing Termination Liability funds on contracts.  Although all program 
offices that were interviewed in this research manage Termination Liability based on 
the funds obligated on contract, the procedures used for ensuring the obligated 
funds are adequate and sufficient to cover Termination Liability expense at any point 
during the contract period of performance varied.  Some program offices maintained 
close coordination with their contractors to monitor and ensure sufficient obligated 
funds to cover estimated Termination Liability expenses throughout the contract 
period, while other program offices depended solely on the contractor to monitor the 
obligated funds to ensure sufficient coverage for Termination Liability.  Some 
program offices conducted periodical “budget drills” to determine if the amount of 
obligated funds at any given time would be sufficient to cover the estimated 
Termination Liability at that point in time.  Some program offices used the Contractor 
Funds Status Report (CFSR) as an aid in monitoring the estimated Termination 
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2.  Diffused Guidance 
The regulatory and policy guidance pertaining to Termination Liability are 
diffused between the Federal Management Regulation (FMR) and the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  The FMR is the main source of financial management 
policy and guidance used by DoD financial and budget managers, while the FAR is 
the main source for contract management policy and guidance used almost 
exclusively by DoD contracting officers.  These two functionally based regulations 
lead to differing interpretations of policy, guidance, and procedures related to the 
management of Termination Liability by the financial-management and contract-
management functional areas.  
3.  Insufficient Databases 
There is no DoD-wide, Service-wide, Command-wide, or Center-wide 
database; yet, one is needed to conduct a proper analysis to determine the total 
number of contracts that require funding for Termination Liability, the total amount of 
Termination Liability funding on these contracts, the total number of contracts 
containing a Special Termination Cost (STC) clause, and the total amount of 
estimated Termination Liability expenses being managed at the Service levels 
because of these STC clauses.  These databases would provide the data that would 
be considered a critical part of the business case needed to calculate the extent of 
the funding being budgeted for Termination Liability expenses. 
4.  Declining Acceptability of Special Termination Cost Clause 
Because of the current acquisition climate of defense acquisition program 
cost overruns and schedule delays, the increased use of the current Special 
Termination Cost Clause (STCC) would not be well received by the Congress or the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  Furthermore, program managers are not 
necessarily receptive to requesting approval of an STCC from their higher 
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Alternative Approaches to Funding Termination 
Liability 
Our research identified the following alternative approaches to managing and 
funding contract termination Liability. 
1.  Impose a “Tax” on All Programs Subject to Termination Liability for the 
Purpose of Establishing an Insurance Fund to Cover Termination Liability. 
The advantages of this alternative include the benefit for program managers 
of not having to commit funds to cover TL, thus allowing better use of funds for 
program execution.  Additionally, since the required Termination Liability funds 
would be identified prior to any termination, any concerns for possible Anti-deficiency 
Act violations should subside.  Finally, for the military departments, significantly 
fewer dollars would be tied up unproductively for TL and would be available for 
program execution. 
The disadvantages of this option include the fact that those programs not at 
risk for termination would have to pay this TL tax, thus decreasing their amount of 
budget for executing the program.  For not-at-risk programs, this tax would make 
program management more difficult. The dollars associated with this tax would not 
be available until late in the fiscal year if they were not used to cover a termination; if 
they were used to cover a termination, the program would lose the money 
permanently—presenting a lose-lose proposition for the program manager.  Finally, 
another disadvantage would be that at-risk programs would not have the funds 
required to pay for the tax available for program execution, thus, putting these 
programs at an increased disadvantage. 
Some of the potential questions related to this alternative include the 
following: 
• Who determines the “tax”? Those programs at greatest risk should 
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• Who determines the risk of a possible program termination? 
• Would the insurance fund provide an attractive target for 
Congressional rescissions as well as Department reprogrammings? 
• When and how would the unused portion of the funds be returned to 
the programs? 
2.  Allow Coverage of Termination Liability to be Assumed at the Major 
Command or PEO Level. 
One advantage of this alternative is that program managers could use all of 
the funds appropriated for their programs for program execution.  Additionally, the 
use of STCCs with the associated Congressional notification would not be required.  
Another advantage of this approach is that the uncertainty of fund availability (as 
opposed to the tax approach) would be eliminated.  Finally, there would not be a pot 
of funds to be targeted by Congress or the Department. 
The disadvantages of this option include the fact that this approach is similar 
to the STCC approach—which has not enjoyed strong support from OMB or the 
Congress.  Additionally, concerns regarding possible Anti-deficiency Act violations 
would likely increase.  Finally, another disadvantage would include the fact that 
paying for a program’s termination costs would likely adversely impact other 
programs. 
Some of the potential issues related to this alternative include the following: 
• This approach would appear to OMB and Congress as an attempt to 
forego budgeting for Termination Liability. 
• A program termination late in the fiscal year could be difficult to fund. 
Above-threshold reprogramming requests are rarely certain or timely. 
3.  Increase the Use of Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC) 
The advantages of this alternative include the benefit that program managers 
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execution.  The uncertainty of fund availability (as opposed to the tax approach) 
would be eliminated for program managers. 
The disadvantages of this option include the fact that Congress and the OMB 
have already exhibited a lack of enthusiasm for the increased use of STCCs.  
Additionally, the paperwork involved with STCCs is considered onerous by the 
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Recommendations 
Based on the research finding and conclusions, the following 
recommendations are provided. 
1.  Remove ambiguity and improve consistency in the regulations.   
The current regulations pertaining to the management of contract termination 
lend themselves to differing and inconsistent interpretations among the Services and 
functional areas (program management, financial management, and contract 
management).  If the “liberal” interpretation of current regulations is different from 
what is desired or is the intent of the agencies, these regulations should be revised 
to remove any ambiguity and to improve the consistency between the functional 
areas.   
2.  Do not impose a tax system to provide funding for potential Termination 
Liability. 
The taxing of program offices for the purpose of generating a pool of funds to 
use for Termination Liability results in a lose-lose proposition for program offices and 
may result in more disadvantages than advantages.  In addition, the potential issues 
related to this alternative would require additional research and analysis. 
3.  Continue to use STCCs for the larger programs with funding or longevity 
concerns. 
For larger, major defense acquisition programs that have a lower probability 
of termination due to visibility, political ties, or urgency of need, the DoD should 
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Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to explore current Department of Defense 
mechanisms for addressing contract termination liability, review current practices 
and procedures for funding and managing Termination Liability, and propose 
alternative approaches to improve the DoD’s ability to manage Termination Liability 
and its effect on defense acquisition programs.  This research reviewed the 
regulatory and policy guidance on contract termination liability.  A review of current 
practices and procedures for funding and managing Termination Liability was 
conducted based on interviews and document reviews with the Air Force, the Navy, 
and other various DoD agencies.  Program management challenges and preliminary 
observations and findings were then presented.  A discussion of alternative 
approaches to funding Termination Liability was discussed, including the use of 
Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC).  Finally, recommendations were 
presented. 
The regulations and policies pertaining to the management and funding of 
contract termination liability are inconsistent and subject to interpretation.  Program 
managers, finance and budget managers, and contracting officers have differing 
interpretations of the requirement for funding Termination Liability.  Furthermore, the 
practices and procedures used in defense acquisition program offices reflect this 
inconsistency. 
In addition, the probability that a government contract will be terminated for 
convenience is very small. Program managers and contractors are aware of the 
statistics, and their approach to Termination Liability reflects that knowledge. The 
normal procedure for handling the potential liability associated with a contract 
terminated for convenience is to “budget” for the liability. Then, in coordination with 
the contractor, the required amount of funding is tracked on a regular basis. In this 
case, budgeting for Termination Liability does not mean obligating funds specifically 
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Additionally, program managers are not in favor of a “tax” that would negate 
the requirement to budget for TL. For the most part, they are satisfied with the status 
quo because the procedure they currently use to handle TL allows them to keep all 
of the funding appropriated for their program. A tax would deprive them of funds that 
they currently have at their disposal. In fact, a program that has funding problems 
could be put in jeopardy by having to relinquish funding to pay for a tax. Program 
managers feel as though the statistics support their current approach. 
Furthermore, if all programs were taxed, there is a general concern that the 
pooled funds would likely be lost for good—either the military Departments (or DoD) 
would use them to solve other problems if they were not required to cover a liability, 
or Congress would look upon the funds that had been set aside as a “slush fund” 
and be tempted to use them elsewhere.  
Also, support for increased use of STCCs is not evident, either at the program 
level or the OMB or Congressional level. Congress has expressed its concern 
regarding STCCs through report language. OMB correspondence has indicated that 
support for more than one STCC per service is unlikely.  However, it should be 
noted that those programs that have significant funding problems and/or are 
concerned about the possibilities of termination do support additional use of STCCs. 
In fact, these programs would prefer to have an STCC that covers more cost 
elements than the standard STCC. 
Finally, this research recommended that the Department of Defense: remove 
the ambiguity and improve the consistency in the regulations pertaining to the 
management of Termination Liability, not impose a tax system to provide funding for 
potential Termination Liability, and continue to use STCCs for the larger programs 
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Attachment 1. Termination Liability Interview 
Questions 
In incrementally funded contracts (See DoD, 2006a, 249.501), there is a 
requirement to identify funds to cover the contingent liability for termination.  These 
funds are set aside for this purpose and may not be used to pay costs for work being 
performed on the contract. 
Question:   Which programs in the Center are required to have funded 
Termination Liability on their contracts?  
Question:   What is the total value of funded Termination Liability for the 
Center? 
Question:   Has any program with funded Termination Liability been 
terminated? 
Question: Has the requirement to fund Termination Liability caused any 
difficulties with managing any other aspects of the program? 
Program managers can apply for a Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
that will waive the requirement for funding and budgeting for Termination Liability on 
the contract.  If the program has an approved STCC clause, the Agency guarantees 
it will find the necessary funds to cover the Termination Liability in the event of a 
termination. 
Question:   Which programs have an approved STCC clause? 
May we have access to STCC clauses (Section H clauses)? 
Question: What is the total value of funds identified on programs with 
STCC clauses at the Center? 
Question:   What is the process for requesting an STCC clause? 
Who coordinates at the Center?  Contracts, FM, Legal? 
Who coordinates at the MAJCOM? Contracts, FM, Legal? 
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How is Congressional approval for the STCC clause obtained? 
What is included in the STCC package? 
Is a program risk (cost, schedule and performance) assessment 
conducted as part of the STCC package? If so, who conducts 
that risk assessment? 
Question:   Has any program with an approved STCC clause been 
terminated? 
If the program has an approved STCC clause, the Agency guarantees that it will find 
the necessary funds to cover the Termination Liability. 
Question:   How does the Agency estimate the amount of term liability it 
needs to cover all of the programs with approved STCCs? 
How does the Agency fund for term liability programs that have 
an approved STCC clause and that have been terminated? 
How does the Agency keep track of those programs (under its 
control) that have approved STCC clauses? 
Does the Agency track the status of previously approved STCC 
programs to monitor those programs’ risk for termination? 
One of the outcomes of this research will be recommendations on potential changes 
to the current system of funding Termination Liability. 
Question: Given your experience with Termination Liability, what changes 
to the process, if any, would you recommend? 
Question: Would a program “tax” to cover Termination Liability for a 
number of programs be acceptable, assuming that the “tax” is 
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